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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FUL TON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DMSION
STA TE OF GEORGIA

BERNARD H. BRONNER, Derivatively
on behalf of Rainforest Production
Holdings, Inc. and directly on behalf of
himself,
Plaintiff,

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

V.

)
)
)
)
)

ROBERT E. HARDY, II,
WILLIAM E. PACKER, JR. and
TRF PRODUCTIONS, LLC,
Individual Defendants,

Civil Action File No.
20 l 4CV248023

Bus. Case Div. 3

)
)

and

)
)

RAINFOREST PRODUCTION
HOLDINGS, INC.

)
)

)
)

Nominal Defendant.

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The above styled action is before this Court on: (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment; (2) Counterclaimants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and (3) Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Having considered the entire record and argument of
counsel, the Court finds as follows:
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The allegations giving rise to this litigation span over two decades. However, the Court
provides a brief summary of the most salient facts below:

Bronner v. Hardy, et al., CAFN 2014CV248023
Order 011 Pending Motions for Summary Judgment

1

Rainforest Production Holdings, Inc. (''Rainforest") was registered as a Georgia
corporation in 1996 by founders Robert E. Hardy ("Hardy") and William E. Packer (Packer) to
produce films directly or through its subsidiaries under the name and mark of Rainforest Films.1

In May 1998, Hardy and Packer formed TRF Productions, LLC ("TRF") as a subsidiary of
Rainforest in order to develop, produce, and distribute a film entitled Trois.2 After production of
the film, Hardy and Packer sought investors to finance its distribution. Following a screening of
the film at the Acapulco Black Film Festival in the summer of 1999, Hardy and Packer were
introduced to Plaintiff Bernard H. Bronner ("Bronner"), who expressed his interest in investing
in Trois.3 Bronner subsequently invested and/or helped to secure investments of over
$500,000.00 in TRF and Rainforest between 1999 and 20004 and ultimately became a
shareholder, director and the Vice President of Marketing for Rainforest.'
After Trois, Rainforest was involved in the production of various films, including: Trois
2: Pandora's Box; The Gospel; Stomp the Yard; and Think Like a Man.6 However, disagreements
arose regarding the management, day-to-day operations and finances of Rainforest. 7 The parties
ultimately sought to resolve their differences via a Shareholder's Reconciliation Agreement
Verified Shareholder Direct and Derivative Complaint ("Complaint"), ,i 24; Defendants' Verified Answer
and Defendants Robert E. Hardy, II, William E. Packer, Jr., and Rainforest Productions Holdings, lnc.'s
Counterclaim Against Bernard H. Bronner (''Defs' Answer and Counterclaim"), ii 24; Defendants' Verified
Amended Answer and Defendants Robert E. Hardy, n, William E. Packer, Jr., and Rainforest Productions Holdings,
Inc. 's Amended Counterclaim Against Bernard H. Bronner ("Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim"), ii 8.
2
Defendants' Statement of Material Facts and Theories of Non-Recovery in Support of Summary Judgment
(''Defs' SMf"), ii 9; Plaintiff Bernard H. Brenner's Response to Defendants' Statements of Material Facts and
Theories of Recovery/Non-Recovery in Support of Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment (''PJ's Response to
Defs' SMF"), if9.
3
Defs' SMF, ,i,i 18-21; Pl's Response to Defs' SMF, iMI 18-21.
4
According to Bronner, the parties entered into Subscription Agreements concerning his investments on
Nov. 2, 1999, Dec. 8, 1999, Jan. 3, 2000, and Feb. I, 2000. Complaint, iJ85. The Feb. I, 2000 Subscription
Agreement includes a handwritten notation stating: "This Subscription Agreement represents Mr. Bronner's total
ownership in TRF Productions, LLC and supersedes all previous Subscription Agreements." Defs' SMF, Ex. K
(TRF Productions, LLC Subscription Booklet executed Feb. I, 2000) at p. 7.
5
Defs' SMF, ,-nl 22, 27; Pl's Response to Defs' SMF, iJi[ 22, 27.
6
Defs' SMF, ,i,i 47, 49, 55, 112; Pl's Response to Defs' SMF, fflj 47, 49, 55.
7
See, e.g., Defs' SMF, i1,i 37, 40-42, 62, 64-68, 73, 75, 79-83, Exs. M-N (emails); PJ's Response to Defs'
SMF, iii] 37, 40-42, 62, 64-68, 73, 75, 79-83.
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("Reconciliation Agreement" or "Agreement" as appropriate) which Rainforest, its wholly
owned-subsidiary Rainforest Films, Hardy, Packer, and Bronner entered into in October 2010.8

At the time, Hardy owned 480,000 shares (32. l %), Packer owned 487,000 shares (31.5%) and
Bronner owned 460,000 shares (30.8%) in Rainforest.'
Pursuant to the Reconciliation Agreement, Rainforest was required to, inter alia:
(1) make a "Reconciliation Payment" to Bronner 1°, (2) prepare and deliver to Bronner a "Trois
Financial Report" 11, (3) calculate and establish certain year-end distributions and a bonus pool 12,
and (4) pay $175,000.00 annual base salaries to Hardy and Packer.13

The Reconciliation

Agreement also set out a compensation structure for Core Business Projects as defined therein.14
Additionally, the Reconciliation Agreement contains a "Mutual Non-Disparagement"
provision which precludes the parties from (1) knowingly and intentionally damaging,
discrediting, or otherwise injuring the goodwill, esteem, or reputation of any party, or (2) making
any false, misleading, or disparaging statement about any other party with respect to such party's
past current or future involvement in Rainforest or any aspect of Rainforest's business or
operations.15 Further, the Agreement contains release provisions whereby Bronner", Rainforest
Defs' SMF, ,i 84, Ex. I (Reconciliation Agreement); Pl's Response to Defs' SMF, il84.
Reconciliation Agreement, Recitals at ii I; Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim, iJ14.
10
"Rainforest Productions shall pay to Bronner an aggregate of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000)
(the "Reconciliation Payment'') ... " Reconciliation Agreement, § 1.1 (emphasis in original).
11
"Within 120 days following the end of calendar year 2010, Rainforest Productions shall have prepared and
delivered to Bronner a financial report (the "Trois Financial Report") setting forth in reasonable detail the financial
results of the feature film "Trois", which report shall be prepared consistent with prevailing financial accounting
practices in the feature film industry... " Reconciliation Agreement, §1.6 (emphasis in original).
12
"Within sixty (60) days following the end of each fiscal year, Rainforest Productions shall calculate and
establish as a "Year-End Bonus Pool" an amount equal to three percent (3%) of the net revenues of Rainforest
Productions and all of its operating entities as a whole (including Rainforest films) during the recently-ended fiscal
year." Reconciliation Agreement,§ 2.5 (emphasis in original).
13
Reconciliation Agreement,§§ 2.2(a), (b).
14
Reconciliation Agreement, §§ 2.3, 2.4
15
Section 3.1 of the Reconciliation Agreement provides in part:
None of Bronner, the Founders, and Rainforest Productions (or any direct or indirect
subsidiary or other affiliated entity of Rainforest Productions and any employee, officer,
director or agent of any of the foregoing) shall knowingly or intentionaJ ly take any action
9
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Productions

17
,

and the Founders18 (Packer and Hardy) released claims and causes of action as to

certain parties. Contemporaneously with the Reconciliation Agreement the parties executed a
Shareholders Agreement which expressly acknowledged and "operated together" with the
Reconciliation Agreement to govern ownership and management of Rainforest moving
forward.19
Nevertheless, m the years following execution of the Reconciliation Agreement the
parties continued to disagree over the operations and finances of Rainforest, including whether
the parties had complied with the requirements of the Agreement, which projects that Packer and
Hardy worked on constituted Rainforest projects for which it may be entitled to proceeds, and
the use of various company-owned resources (e.g., disputes over a wireless service account
opened in the name of Rainforest, an Los Angeles, California apartment owned and paid for by
Rainforest, and a company vehicle).20
Defendants allege "[f]ollowing the Stomp the Yard films in 2010, Hardy and Packer have
not worked together on any project, let alone a Rainforest Productions Core Business Project"
and after those films "Rainforest Productions generated no revenue", requiring Hardy and Packer
at any time for the purpose of damaging, discrediting or otherwise injuring the goodwill,
esteem or reputation of any other party hereto. Without limiting the foregoing, no party
shall make, at any time, any false, misleading or disparaging statement about any other
party hereto with respect to such party's past, current or future involvement in Rainforest
Productions or any aspect of Rainforest Productions' business or operations ...
16
Reconciliation Agreement,§ l.3.
17
Reconciliation Agreement, § 1.4.
18
Reconciliation Agreement,§ 1.5.
19
Defs' SMF, 1192, Ex. J (Shareholders Agreement); Pl's Response to Defs' SMF, ,i 92. The Shareholders
Agreement expressly provides:
Acknowledgment of Reconciliation Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement and
the provisions of the Reconciliation Agreement are intended to be consistent and to
operate together to establish the parameters and protocols for certain aspects of the
relationship among the Founders and Bronner with respect to the operations and affairs of
the Corporation and its operating entities, including Rainforest Films. The parties
expressly agree that the provisions of this Agreement and those of the Reconciliation
Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with such intent.
20
Defs' SMF, ml 79-83, 96-111; Pl's Response to Defs' SMF, ,i,]79-83, 96-108.
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to engage in "pre-existing, independent projects with third-parties" and to "make capital
contributions using money earn ed from individual projects to keep Rainforest Productions in
business and satisfy its financial obligations.t" According to Defendants, in an effort to raise
Rainforest Productions' profile and potentially generate future development opportun ities"
Packer gave "Executive Production (vanity) credit to Rainforest Productions for Think Like a

Man 2, Ride Along, and About Last Night," but because Packer allegedly did not use Rainforest's
name or assets in the production, marketing, or distribution of these films or others he worked on
after 2010, Rainforest was appropriately not compensated.22
Bronner alleges that both before and after the Stomp the Yard films Hardy and Packer
were "loaned out" on various projects as part of Rainforest's business model and they did not
make "capital contributions" as they allege, but rather diverted Rainforest monies and
opportunities for themselves without authorization and attempt to characterize amounts they did
not divert as capital contributions.23 Bronner also alleges Rainforest's "name" was used on other
projects for which Rainforest was not compensated. 24 Further, Bronner asserts Packer used
$400,000.00 of Rainforest's credit for his personal use without notice to or authorization from
shareholders.25
Ultimately, on May 15, 2014, Hardy and Packer circulated a Notice of Special Meeting
of Shareholders and Information Statement disclosing the proposed dissolution of Rainforest and

21

Defs' SMF, iMJ 105-112, 131-132.
Defs' SMF, ml 113, 121.
23
PJ's Response to Defs' SMF, ml 105-112; Plaintiff Bernard H. Bronner's Appendix of Evidentiary
Materials Submitted in Support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Memorandum of Law in Support
Thereof and Statement ofMaterial Facts and His Oppositions to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment ("Pl's
Appendix"), Ex. M (letter dated Apr. 20, 2014 from Hardy to Rainforest Shareholders).
24
PJ's Response to Defs' SMF, 1"111 112-114, 121.
25
Pl's Response to Defs' SMF, ,it 17.
22
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setting a special meeting to occur on May 28, 2014.26 The special meeting was subsequently

moved to June 2, 2014.27 On May 23, 2014, Bronner served the Rainforest Board of Directors,
Packer, and Hardy with a "Shareholder Demand Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-742"28 wherein
Bronner made various demands, including that Rainforest withdraw the Notice of Special
Meeting, investigate whether Packer and Hardy had harmed the company by failing to meet their
fiduciary duties, engage an appraiser to evaluate the value of the business, and produce various
business records.29 The Notice of Special Meeting was not withdrawn and the special meeting
proceeded on June 2, 2014 at which the requisite majority of Rainforest shareholders voted in
favor of the proposed dissolution of Rainforest and its subsidiaries, which according to the
Board's adopted Plan of Liquidation and Dissolution, involved the establishment of a liquidation
trust and a sale of the rights to the Rainforest name and logo to Hardy for $10,000.00.30 Articles
of Dissolution of Rainforest Films, Inc. and Rainforest Production Holdings, Inc. were filed with
the Georgia Secretary of State to effectuate the dissolution.31
Shortly following Rainforest's dissolution, Plaintiff Bronner filed this lawsuit on June 20,
2014, asserting various causes of action against Defendants directly as well as derivatively on
behalf of Rainforest, including: (1) breach of Subscription Agreement (direct claim asserted
against TRF Productions); (2) fraud (direct claim asserted against Hardy and Packer); (3) breach
of fiduciary duty (derivative claim against Hardy and Packer); (4) "lack of candor" (derivative
claim asserted against Hardy and Packer); (5) "gross mismanagement"

(derivative claim

26

Defs' SMF, Ex. 0 (Correspondence and Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders dated May 15, 2014;
Information Statement for Special Meeting of Shareholders).
27
Defs' SMF, Ex. W (Notice of Special Meeting Date Change dated May 19, 2014).
28
Hereinafter "Shareholder Demand".
29
Defs' SMF, ,i 151, Ex. P (Shareholder Demand Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2- 742 dated May 23, 2014); Pis'
Response to Defs' SMF, ii 15 l; PJ's Appendix, Ex. BB.
30
Defs' SMF, Ex. Q (Exhibits to Minutes of Special Meeting of Shareholders Jun. 2, 2014), Ex. 0
(Information Statement for Special Meeting of Shareholders) at pp. I 0-17.
31
Defs' SMF, Ex. R (Articles of Dissolution).
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asserted against Hardy and Packer); (6) "waste of corporate assets" (derivative claim asserted
against Hardy and Packer); (7) unjust enrichment (derivative claim asserted against Hardy and
Packer); (8) "abuse of control" (derivative claim asserted against Hardy and Packer); (9)
quantum meruit (derivative claim asserted against Hardy and Packer); (10) appointment of a
receiver (derivate claim asserted generally); and (11) "misappropriation of corporate assets"
(derivative claim asserted against Hardy and Packer).32

Defendants/Counterclaimants have asserted a counterclaim against Bronner alleging that,
Bronner and/or his agents made and continue to make false, disparaging, and defamatory
remarks about Defendants to third parties, including releasing the contents of his Complaint in
this litigation to media outlets so that outlets would publish the allegedly false statements
contained therein, and using Sean Merrick a/k/a Jacky Jasper ("Jasper"), who operates the online
blog Hollywood Street King, to publish false, disparaging, and defamatory statements concerning
Packer on Bronner's behalf.33 Defendants/Counterclaimants allege Bronner maliciously and
falsely "asserted that Hardy and Packer engaged in fraudulent practices related to the business
operations of Rainforest and have fraudulently failed to pay Rainforest's investors the money the
investors are owed as a return of their investments.v'" Additionally, they assert Bronner
misappropriated company resources for his personal benefit, including misusing the corporate
Los Angeles apartment and improperly using company resources to pay for cellular expenses,
travel expenses, and automobile expenses.35 In their counterclaim, Defendants/Counterclaimants

32

Brenner's "First Cause of Action" against Hardy and Packer for "oppression" was previously dismissed by
the Court. See Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings (Apr. 13, 2015).
33
Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim, ,i 54, 57-62; Defs' SMF, ,-i,i 126-130; Counterclaimants'
Statement of Material Facts and Theories of Recovery in Support of Partial Summary Judgment - Counterclaims
("Counterclaimants' SMF"), ii,i 36-42, Ex. B (Packer Aff.) at Ex. 9 (collection of articles at issue referencing
Packer; referred to generally herein as "Jasper articles").
34
Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim, ii,i 55-56.
3
s
Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim, ,i,i 80-87; Counterclaimants' SMF, iMl 2, 17-21.
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assert causes of action for: (1) breach of contract (asserted by Rainforest, Packer, and Hardy); (2)
defamation (asserted by Packer and Hardy); (3) unjust enrichment/set off (asserted by
Rainforest); and (4) expenses oflitigation.
SUMMAR Y JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summ ary judgment should be granted when the movant shows that "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgm ent as a matter oflaw."
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). If the moving party meets its initial burden of proof, the nonm oving
party cann ot rest on mere allegations or denials in its pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. O.C.G.A.§9-11-56(e).
A genuine issue of material fact exists where the facts in the record create a conflict in
the evidence as to a material issue that could affect the outcome of the case under the governing
law. See Shell v. Tidewater Fin. Co., 318 Ga. App. 69, 69, 733 S.E.2d 375 (2012); Johnson v.

Unified Residential Dev. Co., Inc., 285 Ga. App. 852, 857, 648 S.E.2d 163, 168 (2002).
Guesses, speculation, and conjecture are not enough to create a genuine issue of fact and defeat
summary judgment. Hill v. Jackson, 336 Ga. App. 679, 681, 783 S.E.2d 719, 723 (2016).
However, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant should be given the
benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences and
conclusions therefrom most favorably toward the party opposing the motion. ARP v. United
Cmty. Banlc, 272 Ga. App. 331, 331, 612 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2016); Smith v. Tenet Health Sys.
Spalding, Inc., 327 Ga. App. 878, 879, 761 S.E.2d 409,411 (2014). See Word v. Henderson, 220
Ga. 846, 848, 142 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1965) ("Where the evidence on motion for summary
judgment is ambiguous or doubtful, the party opposing the motion must be given the benefit of
Bronner v. Hardy, et al., CAFN 2014CV248023
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all reasonable doubts and of all favorable inferences and such evidence construed most favorably
to the opposing party opposing the motion").
Further, "[w]hen ... the parties file cross-motions for sum mary judgm ent, 'each party
must show [that) there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the resolution of [the
essential] points of inquiry and that each, respectively, is entitled to summary judgm ent; either
party, to prevail by summ ary judgm ent, must bear its burden of proof." Plantation Pipe Line Co.
v. Stonewall Ins. Co. 335 Ga. App. 302, 780 S.E.2d 501 (2015) (citing Morgan Enterprises, Inc.
v. Gordon Gillett Business Realty. 196 Ga. App. 112,395 S.E.2d 303 (1990)).

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants move the Court for summary judgment in their favor with respect to all of

Plaintiffs direct and derivative claims. Plaintiff has crossed moved for partial summary
judgment with respective to his derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duties. The Court shall
consider these claims in turn.
A.

Plaintiff's Direct Claims

Plaintiff asserts two direct claims against Defendants: a breach of contract claim which
based on the record appears to be asserted against TRF for breach of the Subscription Agreement
and/or against Defendants for breach of the Reconciliation Agreement; and a fraud claim against
Packer and Hardy for allegedly misrepresenting Rainforest's financial figures and accounting
and by altering the financial figures relating to Trois and TRF in order to divert money that
Bronner claims was owed to him.
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1.

Breach of Contract

"The elements for a breach of contract claim in Georgia are the (1) breach and the (2)
resultant damages (3) to the party who has the right to complain about the contract being
broken." SAWS at Seven Hills, LLC v. Forestar Realty, Inc., 342 Ga. App. 780, 784, 805 S.E.2d
270,274 (2017) (citing Dewrell Sacks, LLP v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 324 Ga. App. 219,223 (2)
(a), 749 S.E.2d 802 (2013)).
Here, Bronner's Complaint alleges TRF breached the Subscription Agreement by failing
to make certain corporate distributions.36 However, Bronner has also alleged in this litigation
Defendants breached the Reconciliation Agreement by not establishing year-end bonus pools for
several years, failing to provide an adequate financial report concerning Trois, and failing to
comply with the compensation structure set forth in the agreement for Single Contractor and
Joint Contractor Core Business Projects.37 Defendants assert they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the contract claim on several grounds, including: (1) the claim is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, (2) the claim is barred by the parties' Reconciliation Agreement,
(3) Bronner lacks standing to bring this claim directly, (4) Bronner is not entitled to the soughtafter distributions, and (5) because Bronner cannot establish any recoverable damages.
a) Statute of limitations with respect to breach of contract claims arising
before June 2008
In Georgia, "[ajll actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six
years after the same become due and payable." O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24.
It is well settled that the six-year statute of limitations applies to claims

involving the breach of a written contract. .. It is equally settled that for
simple contracts this six-year period begins to run on the date the contract
36

CompJaint, ~ 86.
See, e.g., Bronner Depo. (Jan. 26, 2017), pp. 92-96, 127-140, 147-151; Plaintiff Bernard H. Brenner's
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl's Opp. to Defs' MSJ"), pp. 4-5.
37
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is breached and the wrongful acts occur, not the date the actual damage
results or is discovered.
Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Darryl J. Panella, LLC, 319 Ga. App. 274, 276, 734 S.E.2d
523 (2012). Thus, for the claim to be actionable, a claimant must point to evidence in the record
showing that the breach of the contract occurred within six years of the filing of the complaint.
Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga. App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779 (2007).
However, the statute of limitations may be tolled if a claimant can show that the opposing
party's conduct prevented him from discovering or asserting the cause of action. See O.C.G.A. §
9-3-96 ("If the defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the
plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall run
only from the time of the plaintiffs discovery of the fraud"). In order to establish fraudulent
concealment under O.C.G.A. §9-3-96 sufficient to toll the statute of limitations,
a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant committed actual fraud
involving moral turpitude, (2) the fraud concealed the cause of action from
the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to
discover his cause of action despite his failure to do so within the

applicable statute of limitation.
Cochran Mill Assocs. v. Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241, 245, 648 S.E.2d 764, 767 (2007) (emphasis
added). "The plaintiff has the burden of showing the existence of facts that would toll the statute
of limitation," Falanga v. Kjrschner & Venker, P.C., 286 Ga. App. 92, 94,648 S.E.2d 690 (2007).
Importantly,
[t]he fraud which tolls a statute of limitation must be such actual fraud as
could not have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence.
This rule is applied even where actual fraud is the gravamen of the action.
The statute of limitation is only tolled until the fraud is discovered or by
reasonable diligence should have been discovered.

Bronner v. Hardy, et al., CAFN 2014CV248023
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Bauer v. Weeks, 267 Ga. App. 617, 619, 600 S .E.2d 700, 702-03 (2004) (quoting Bahadori v.
Nat') Union Fire Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 203, 205(3), 507 S.E.2d 467 (1998)).
Finally, although the level of diligence in investigating fraud is lessened where a
confidential relationship exists, "it is not entirely extinguished." Cochran Mill Assocs., 286 Ga.

App. at 247 (citing Hunter. Maclean. Exley & Dunn. P.C. v. Frame, 269 Ga. 844, 848(1), 507
S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998)). Thus, when a party fails to exercise due diligence as a matter of law,
the issue of diligence may be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Smith v. Suntrust
Bank, 325 Ga. App. 53 I, 544, 754 S.E.2d 117 (2014) ("A party may fail to exercise due
diligence as a matter of law"); Nash v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 266 Ga. App. 416, 418, 597
S.E.2d 512, 515 (2004). See Falanga, 286 Ga. App. at 95 ( concluding that limitations period was
not tolled, despite fiduciary relationship, where the plaintiff failed to review available statements
revealing alleged fraud); Almond v. Young. 314 Ga. App. 230, 230-31, 723 S.E.2d 691 (2012)
("This Court has held that mere silence or a failure to disclose, even where there existed a
fiduciary relationship, will not toll the statute of limitation for fraud where "the information was
open and available") (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants breached the Subscription Agreement by failing to
make required distributions. The six-year limitations period began to run when the alleged
breaches of the Subscription Agreement occurred, which, according to Plaintiffs deposition
testimony, happened on multiple occasions over the course of several years, many of them
outside of the limitations period. Specifically, Bronner testified that prior to 2010 "[he] went ten
years without receiving a portion of the profits" and in that regard "[he] went ten years of
fighting for the original Trois investors.v" In a 2009 email to Defendants Packer and Hardy,
38

Bronner Depo. (Jan. 26, 2017), p. 123.
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Bronner noted that the last distribution he received was sometime in 2005.

39

In regard to

Bronner's claim Defendants did not provide accurate financial accounting, Bronner testified
Defendants failed to provide documentation regarding alleged losses "from year two, three, four,
five, six, seven, eight and nine',4o of the parties' business dealings (which began in the 1999) and
he also testified "[w]ord on the street was Rob [Hardy] and Will [Packer] had just ripped us all
off_,,41
Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations concerning
Trois' financial performance tolled the statute of limitations on his contract claim, and although
he was "exploring the possibility oflegal action" no later than 2009, he instead negotiated with
Defendants to enter into the Reconciliation Agreement.42 Plaintiff asserts he exercised sufficient
due diligence in investigating Rainforest's finances, citing to a 2010 meeting with Rainforest's
accountant, Barren Watson, to understand the Trois accounting statement that was provided
following execution of the Reconciliation Agreement.

43

Additionally, Plaintiff contends because

there was a confidential relationship with Defendants a lesser level of diligence in discovering
his claims is required. The Court is not persuaded.
As noted above, Bronner acknowledged having suspicions regarding Rainforest's
financials beginning early in the parties' business dealings and those suspicions festered for at
least a decade during which time Defendants allegedly consistently failed to pay distributions
Bronner contends were due and did not provide an adequate accounting of the company's

39
40
41

42
43

Pl's Appendix, Ex. LL.
Bronner Depo. (Jan. 26, 2017), pp. 127-30.
BronnerDepo. (Jan. 26, 2017), p. 129.
Pl's Opp. to Defs' MSJ, p. 7.
Pl's Response to Defs' SMF,, 102; Pl's Opp. to Defs' MSJ, p. 10.
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finances despite the apparently public success of Trois and various other Rainforest films. As

summarized by Bronner:
... [Y]ou have not been paid in ten years and you're seeing number one
box office every year for ten years and you still have not been getting
paid, after ten years any normal person would have these kinds of feelings.
This is ten years of not getting paid ... After ten years. I kept my peace,
kept my cool for nine years. And on the tenth year I basically came to the
point that enough is enough. 44
However, a party on notice of a suspected claim cannot sit on his hands for a decade, fail
to exercise rights to obtain information or to pursue such claims, and then allege fraud tolls the
applicable limitations period.45 Such does not constitute due diligence as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court finds fraud does not to11 the six-year limitations period on Plaintiff's
breach of contract claim and, as such, any such alleged breach of the Subscription Agreement
that occurred before June 20, 2008, is time barred as a matter oflaw.
b) Breach of contract claims arising after June 2008
i. Enforceability ofReconciliation Agreement and election ofremedies
The record demonstrates Plaintiff has asserted two alternative theories of recovery on his
breach of contract claim. On one hand, Plaintiff argues the Reconciliation Agreement and the
releases contained therein are void and unenforceable (because he was fraudulently induced to
enter the contract, among other cited reasons) such that his contract claim is predicated on an
alleged breach of the Subscription Agreement by TRF for failing to pay distributions. On the
Bronner Depo. (Jan. 26, 2017), p. 123.
As an officer and shareholder of Rainforest Productions, Bronner would be entitled to access/inspect
certain records of Rainforest, including its accounting records. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(c)(2). See also O.C.G.A.
§§ 14-2-80 l (b), 14-2-84 l. The Georgia Court of Appeals bas held that a shareholder "is not entitled to negligently
refuse to acquire knowledge that was open and available ... througb inspection of the corporation's books and
records. Put another way, a shareholder cannot tum a blind eye on information available to him." Rollins v. LOR,
Inc., 345 Ga. App. 832,846,815 S.E.2d 169, 181 (2018) (internal quotations omitted). Despite alleging during his
testimony that Defendants made numerous misrepresentations about Trois' and Rainforest Production's financial
performance, Bronner has not cited to any evidence in the record that he attempted to exercise or enforce his rights
as a shareholder or officer to inspect Rainforest's records prior to 20 I 0.
45
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other hand, Plaintiff asserts Defendants breached various provisions of the Reconciliation
Agreement. 46
"In general, a party alleging fraudulent inducement to enter a contract bas two options:

(1) affirm the contract and sue for breach; or (2) rescind the contract and sue in tort for fraud."
Cotton v. Bank S., 231 Ga. App. 812, 813-14, 499 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1998) {citing Jones v.
Cartee, 227 Ga. App. 401, 403, 489 S.E.2d 141(1997)). "A contract may be rescinded at the
instance of the party defrauded; but, in order to rescind, the defrauded party must promptly, upon
discovery of the fraud, restore or offer to restore to the other party whatever he has received by
virtue of the contract if it is of any value." O.C.G.A § 13-4-60.
"In order to rescind a contract and sue for restitution, a plaintiff must first restore or make

a bona fide effort to restore to the other party whatever benefits he has received from the
transaction." Daly v. Mueller, 279 Ga. App. 168, 169-70, 630 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2006) (quoting
Graham v. Cook, 179 Ga. App. 603, 604(1), 347 S.E.2d 623 (1986)). However,
(w]here a party who is entitled to rescind a contract on ground of fraud or
false representations, and who has full knowledge of the material
circumstances of the case, freely and advisedly does anything which
amounts to a recognition of the transaction, or acts in a manner
inconsistent with a repudiation of the contract, such conduct amounts to
46

Compare Pl's Opp. to Defs' MSJ, p. 13-14 (" ... Reconciliation Agreement being void and
unenforceable ... "); Id. at 19 ("The Reconciliation Agreement is void and unenforceable ... "); Id. at 22 (" ... the
Reconciliation Agreement is void and unenforceable ... "); Id. p. 16 (Plaintiff asserting that he has standing to assert
his direct claim "for breach of contract O against TRF for breach of his Subscription Agreement with Bronner [)'')
with Id. at p. 4 (asserting a material fact remains as to "[w]hether Defendants violated the terms of the
Reconciliation Agreement by taking 100% of revenue directed from loan out projects"); Plaintiff's Brief in
Opposition to Counterclaimants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaims («PJ's Opp. to Counterclaimants'
MSJ"), p. 7-8, 12 (Defendants violated the Reconciliation Agreement, Section 2.5 by only performing "certain
calculations and establish[ing] year-end bonus pool.. .for 2010 and 2011, but not for 2012, 2013 or 2014."); Id. at 7,
13 (Defendants failed to comply with the Reconciliation Agreement when they failed to "deliver a certain financial
report concerning Trois, consistent with prevailing financial accounting practices ... such that a determination could
be made as to Trois' profitability and appropriate distributions could be made in the event of profit."); Id. at 8
(Defendants violated the Reconciliation Agreement when they did not comply with the "compensation structure
for ... Hardy and Packerj]" which did not "permit...[them] to take 100% of monies earned from film and other
projects."); Bronner Depo. (Jan. 26, 2017), pp. 92-96, 136-151 (discussing Defendants' alleged, multiple breaches of
the Reconciliation Agreement).
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acquiescence, and, though originally impeachable, the contract becomes
unimpeachable in equity. If a party to a contract seeks to avoid it on the
ground of fraud or mistake, he must, upon discovery of the facts, at once
announce his purpose and adhere to it. Otherwise he can not avoid or
rescind such contract.
Owens v. Union City Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 378, 380, 436 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1993)
(citing Gibson v. Alford. 161 Ga. 672, 673(5), 132 S.E. 442 (1926)). Indeed, when a party elects
to rescind, he must do so before filing a suit. Williams v. Fouche, 157 Ga. 227, 121 S.E. 217
(1924) ("[T]he rule requiring one who seeks the rescission of a contract on the ground of fraud to
restore, or offer to restore, the consideration received, as a condition precedent to bringing the
action, is settled in this state"); Novare Grp., Inc. v. Sarif, 290 Ga. 186, 188, 718 S.E.2d 304,307
(2011).
Having considered the record, the Court finds the Reconciliation Agreement is generally
enforceable. In Georgia, "[a] contract is an agreement between two or more parties for the doing
or not doing of some specified thing." O.C.G.A. §13-1-1. "To constitute a valid contract, there
must be parties able to contract, a consideration moving to the contract, the assent of the parties
to the terms of the contract, and a subject matter upon which the contract can operate." O.C.G.A.
§ 13-3-1.
Here, all essential elements of an enforceable contract are met. Although Plaintiff claims
the Reconciliation Agreement fails for lack of consideration because the Reconciliation Payment
made to him was for monies already owed to him as an investor, the agreement was expressly
intended to reconcile differences among the parties "concerning their respective roles in the
business and affairs of Rainforest Productions and its affiliates, and payment to them with
respect thereto" and was intended to establish "terms, parameters, and protocols for their future
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relationship.?" With respect to paym ents previously made or allegedly owed, the Reconciliation
Agreement expressly provides:
Beyond the Reconciliation Paym ent pursuant to Section 1.1 hereof, and in
consideration of the distributions and paym ents previously made, no
further distributions or paym ents in any form shall be made to Bronner or
to any of the Trois Investors in respect of any past promise, commitment,
assurance, other statement or indication that may have been previously
given to (or understood by) Bronner or any of the Trois Investors, whether
oral or in writing, in connection with any investment by Bronner or any
Trois Investor in Rainforest Productions or any of its affili ates (each, a

"Prior Investment Commitment"), unless any such distribution or
payment is required pursuant to Section 1.6 hereof. The parties expressly
agree that, upon receipt by Bronner of the Reconciliation Payment, all
Prior Investment Commitments have been fully and completely satisfied,
and neither Bronner nor any Trois Investor shall be entitled to assert or
maintain hereafter any claim, cause of action or other alleged right in
connection with any purported Prior Investment Commitment, subject to
the provisions of Section 1.6.48
Thus, even if Plaintiff was previously promised or owed funds as an investor, the
Reconciliation Agreement expressly encompassed and resolved such claims as well as other
"differences" between the parties in exchange for the Reconciliation Payment as well as other
promises and releases contained therein. Such is legally sufficient consideration. See Hayes v.
Alexander, 264 Ga. App. 815, 818, 592 S.E.2d 465, 469 (2003) ("Any benefit accruing to the
one who makes the promise, or any loss, trouble, or disadvantage undergone by, or charge
imposed upon, the one to whom the promise is made, is sufficient consideration") ( citing Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co. of Dothan. Alabama v. First Nat. Bank of Columbus, 248 Ga. 114, 116(2), 281
S.E.2d 579 (1981)). See also Sims v. Bayside Capital, Inc., 327 Ga. App. 47, 50, 755 S.E.2d 520,
523 (2014) ("Even if th]e] consideration is wholly inadequate, in the absence of 'great disparity
of mental ability in contracting a bargain,' a contract cannot be set aside for inadequate

47

48

Reconciliation Agreement, Recitals at i1s.
Reconciliation Agreement, ~l.2 (emphasis in original).
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consideration") (citing Kimbrell v. Connor. 218 Ga. App. 812, 813-814, 463 S.E.2d 376 (1995));
O.C.G.A. § 13-3-46 ("Mere inadequacy of consideration alone will not void a contract").

To the extent Plaintiff claims Defendants failed to satisfy certain conditions or
requirements of the Reconciliation Agreement, nothing in the Agreement suggests there were
conditions precedent that had to be satisfied before the parties' rights and obligations thereunder
were triggered. Indeed, the Reconciliation Agreement expressly provides that it is "effective as
of' its execution on October 8, 2010. See also Sheridan v. Crown Capital Corp., 251 Ga. App.
314,318, 554 S.E.2d 296,300 (2001) ("The law favors conditions to be subsequent rather than
precedent and to be remediable by damages rather than by forfeiture") (citing Fulton Cty. v.
Collum Properties, Inc., 193 Ga. App. 774,775,388 S.E.2d 916,918 (1989)); O.C.G.A. §13-3-4.
Plaintiff also claims the Reconciliation Agreement is "void and unenforceable" because
he was fraudulently induced to enter into it. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts:
Prior to entering the Reconciliation Agreement, Hardy and Packer
deceived Bronner by misrepresenting the financials and operations of
Rainforest, including a) omitting the fact that Packer was actively utilizing
hundreds of thousands of dollars of Rainforest funds for personal use, b)
omitting the fact that Hardy and Packer were diverting Rainforest
opportunities for their personal companies[,] c) misrepresenting Rainforest
and Trois profits (both directly and through accountant Barren Watson.49
Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not sought to rescind the Reconciliation Agreement nor
returned or offered to return the $200,000.00 Reconciliation Payment he received pursuant
thereto. Insofar as Plaintiff has not properly sought to rescind the Reconciliation Agreement on
the basis of his alleged fraudulent inducement and by keeping the Reconciliation Payment has
taken action "inconsistent with a repudiation of the contract", he can now only affirm the

41)

Pl's Opp. to Defs' MSJ, p. 19.
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contract and pursue a claim for breach thereof. Cotton, 231 Ga. App. at 813-14; Jones, 227 Ga.
App. at 403; William s, 157 Ga. at 227; Owens, 210 Ga. App. at 380.
Further, to the extent any such claim for breach of the Reconciliation Agreement is
predicated on alleged promises, statements or misrepresentations made before the Agreement
was entered into, such is barred by the Agreement's merger provision which states:
This Agreement supersedes all prior discussions and agreements between
or among the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and this
Agreement, together with documents that are attached hereto as Exhibits
and Schedules, contains the sole and entire agreement between or am ong
the parties with respect to the matters covered hereby.50

See Cotton, 231 Ga. App. at 814 (where a party fails to timely rescind a contract with a merger
clause and instead affirms the contract, he is "estopped from asserting any reliance upon the
alleged misrepresentation made prior to execution of the contract"); Owens, 210 Ga. App. at 380.
See also Liberty v. Storage Tr. Properties, L.P., 267 Ga. App. 905,910,600 S.E.2d 841, 845-46
(2004) ("A merger clause prevents a recovery in contract because it 'operates as a disclaimer,
establishing that the written agreement completely and comprehensively represents all the
parties' agreement' ... As a result, where a contract contains a merger clause, a party cannot assert
'they relied upon representations other than those contained in the contract"') (quoting Authentic
Architectural Millworks v. SCM Group USA 262 Ga. App. 826, 828(2), 586 S.E.2d 726
(2003)).
ii. Remaining breach ofcontract claim
Defendants assert the Reconciliation Agreement and the releases contained therein bar
any claims against them premised on alleged events that took place before it was executed on
October 8, 2010. The Court agrees.
so

Reconciliation Agreement, §5.3.
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With respect to the release by Bronner, the Reconciliation Agreement provides:
Effective as of the Signing, Bronner. .. hereby fully and generally releases,
remises, acquits and fully discharges the Founders, Rainforest

Productions and their respective affiliates, including, without limitation,
any direct or indirect subsidiary or other affiliated entity of Rainforest
Productions, any director, officer, employee, shareholder, professional
advisor or agent of any of the foregoing (collectively, the "Rainforest
Released Parties") from any and all claims, actions, causes of action and
other alleged rights (whether known, unknown, fixed or contingent) that
Bronner has, has ever had or may hereafter have against any of [sic]
Rainforest Released Parties, with respect to any Prior Investment
Commitment and any financial support that Bronner may have provided to
Rainforest Productions or any of its affiliates from time to time in the
past."
Insofar as the Reconciliation Agreement is enforceable, the foregoing release clearly and
unambiguously bars any breach of contract claim (or other direct claims asserted by Bronner
against Defendants) arising prior to Oct. 8, 2010, including against TRF given that it is
undisputedly an "affiliate" and "subsidiary" of Rainforest Productions. See Harkins v. CA 14th
Inv'rs. Ltd., 247 Ga. App. 549,550,544 S.E.2d 744, 746 (2001).
Nevertheless, construing the evidence and all inferences and conclusions therefrom most
favorably to Plaintiff, giving him the benefit of all reasonable doubt, a jury question remains as
to whether Defendants breached the Reconciliation Agreement, including whether Defendants:
performed the calculations for a Year-End Distribution and Bonus Pool in 2012, 2013, and 2014
pursuant to §2.552; prepared and delivered to Bronner "a financial report ... setting forth in
reasonable detail the financial results of the feature film "Trois", which report shall be prepared
consistent with prevailing financial accounting practices in the feature film industry" as

51

Reconciliation Agreement, § 1.3 (bold and italicized emphasis added). See also id. at § 1.2 (defining "Prior
Investment Commitment").
52
See, e.g., PI's Response to Defs' SMF, ii 99; Packer Depo. (Jan. 31, 2018), pp. 294-309, 311-315, 320;
Counterclaimants' SMF, Ex. Q (Year-End Distribution/Bonus Pool Calculations for 2010 and 2011); Defs' SMF,
Ex. A (Hardy Affidavit) at i]37, Ex. B (Packer Affidavit) at il36.
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required under § 1.6 (emphasis added)53; and complied with Article II regarding the financial

management of Rainforest related to its Core Business54, including with regards to the use of
Rainforest films and its other operating entities and the compensation structure set forth for
Single Contractor and Joint Contractor Core Business Projects as defined and described
thereunder. 55 Although Defendants contend Rainforest was never profitable and they characterize
funds received by Rainforest as voluntary "capital contributions", payments made to investors
and shareholders as "gratuitous", and Executive Producer credit given to Rainforest as merely
"vanity" credit, given this record the Court simply cannot say as a matter of law no evidence

53

See, e.g., Defs' SMF, Ex. L (one page Trois Accounting); Bronner Depo. (Jan. 26, 2017), pp. 136-151
(describing Defendants' alleged failure to comply with §1.6); Packer Depo. (May 5, 2018), pp. 172-173
(acknowledging Trois Accounting did not include revenue from an "HBO deal" and that one would need to
reference other materials to understand specific figures).
54
Notably, the Reconciliation Agreement describes Rainforest's "Core Business" as broadly encompassing
film and television activities involving both direct and indirect services provided by Hardy and Packer: "Rainforest
Productions uses Rainforest films as its principal operating entity in performing its feature film, television, and other
motion picture business activities (the "Core Business") that involve the direct and indirect provision of services by
the Founders or other personnel of Rainforest Productions' affiliated group of entities." Reconciliation Agreement,
Recitals at~ 3. "Core Business Projects" is generally defined as "all projects that are part of its Core Business." Ml,
Recitals at~ 4.
55
See, e.g., Reconciliation Agreement, § 2.1 ("Rainforest Productions shall continue to use Rainforest Films
or another operating entity of or controlled by Rainforest Productions to engage in all Core Business Projects in
which either of the Founders receives any compensation or other payment for his services as a result of such Core
Business Project. No compensation or other payment may be made to either of the Founders on account of any
service performed by a Founder with respect to any Core Business Project, excepted as provided in this Agreement
or unless such compensation or other payment is approved by the Board of Directors of Rainforest Productions
;,, a vote in whiclt the Bro1111er Director joins ... ") (bold and italicized emphasis added); id. at § 2.3 (setting forth
the compensation structure for Single Contractor Core Business Projects "where (1) the personal services of 011/y of
Hardy or Packer are contracted on a11 individual basis (as opposed to the services of Rainforest Films or another
Rainforest Productions operating entity per se) for the project.. .(2) the other individual is not so contracted or is
engaged and paid on a separate basis for personal services that are not part of the Core Business of Rainforest
Productions, and (3) the name or assets of Rainforest Films or another Rainforest Production operating entity are
nonetheless to be used in the project. .. ") (bold and italicized emphasis added); Bronner Depo. (Jan. 26, 2017), pp.
55-57 (describing Sony's role as financing certain projects involving Rainforest where Rainforest "was contracted
and paid based on percentage of sales"); PJ's Appendix, Ex. M (letter dated Apr. 20, 2014 from Hardy to Rainforest
Shareholders describing "loan outs" of Hardy and Packer's services in exchange for a portion of fees earned being
paid to Rainforest until January 2012 when Hardy and Packer stopped receiving a salary from Rainforest and instead
kept 100% of the funds generated); Hardy Depo. (Jan. 29, 2018), pp. 274-308, 314-3l7 (describing the Apr. 20,
2014 letter to shareholders and the change in how Hardy and Packer's compensation was handled); Defs' SMF, fl
113, 121 (acknowledging Rainforest was given Executive Producer credit for Think Like a Man 2, Ride Along, and
About Last Night).
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exists to support a breach of contract claim against Defendants.56 Thus, Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED, IN PART, and DENIED, IN PART, as set forth above.
2.

Fraud

"In order to prove fraud, the plaintiff must establish five elements: (1) a false
representation by a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain
from acting, (4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damage to plaintiff." Engelman v.
Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239,246,797 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2017), cert. denied (Aug. 14, 2017) (citing
to Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake Erma, LLC, 316 Ga. App. 832,835 (1), 730 S.E.2d 556 (2012)).
Here, Brenner's Complaint alleges Hardy and Packer committed fraud by "[b]y
repeatedly, falsely and fraudulently representing the financial figures and accounting of
[Rainforest]" and "[b ]y fraudulently altering the financial figures provided to Plaintiff related to
Trois and [Rainforest] in order to mispresent the true financials of [Rainforest] in order to divert
monies that lawfully belong to Plaintiff. "57 Defendants assert they are entitled to a judgment a as
a matter of law on the fraud claim because the claim: ( 1) is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations; (2) is barred by the Reconciliation Agreement; and (3) cannot be asserted directly.58

a) Statute of limitations with respect to fraud claim arising before June
2010

S6

Importantly, the Reconciliation Agreement was executed by Rainforest Films and Rainforest Productions
as well as by Bronner, Hardy, and Packer individually, and it sets forth specific contractual rights and obligations by
and between those parties.
57
Complaint, ii 89.
58
Defendants also assert judgment should be entered in their favor as a matter of law on Bronner's fraud
claim due to the failure to plead fraud with the requisite particularity See O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-9(b). However, given
Defendants never moved to dismiss the claim on such grounds and in light of the now exhaustive record which
includes multiple allegations and testimony regarding Defendants' alleged failure to provide accurate financial
information regarding Rainforest, the Court is not persuaded.
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Fraud claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31.

("Actions for injury to personalty shall be brought within four years after the right of the action
accrues.") As outlined above, a limitations period may be tolled by such fraud which debars or
deters the plaintiff from bringin g an action. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §9-3-96; Cochran Mill Assocs.,

286 Ga. App. at 245; Bauer v. Weeks, 267 Ga. App. at 619; Bahadori, 270 Ga. at 205(3); Nash,
266 Ga. App. at 417-18, 597 S.E.2d 512 (2004).
Here, although Plaintiff argues Hardy's and Packer's fraudulent concealment and
misrepresentation of financial information concerning Trois and other Rainforest projects tolled
the statute of limitations, for the same reasons set forth in Part I(A)(1 )(a), supra, the Court finds
the limitations period was not tolled with respect to the fraud claim. Thus, to the extent the fraud
claim is predicated on conduct that occurred prior to June 20, 2010, the claim is time-barred.
b) Fraud claim arising after June 2010
To extent the fraud claim is based on alleged misrepresentations made prior to execution
of the Reconciliation Agreement, as discussed in Part l(A)(l)(b)(ii), supra, such is precluded
under the release contained therein whereby Bronner "on behalf of himself. .. fully discharge[d]
the Founders, Rainforest Productions and their respective affiliates, including ... any direct or
indirect subsidiary .. .from ally and all claims, actions, causes of action ... that Bronner has, has
ever had or may have hereafter have ... with respect to any Prior Investment Commitment and any
financial support that Bronner may have provided to Rainforest Productions or any of its
affiliates from time to time in the past. "59
Further, as to Plaintiff's fraud allegations arising within the four-year limitations period,
the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to point to evidence in the record establishing that he was

59

Reconciliation Agreement,§ L.3 (emphasis added).
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uniquely injured by any alleged fraud commi tted by Hardy and Packer so as to maintain the
fraud claim directly against those Defendants. "In general, derivative actions are required in the
ordinary corporate context: (1) to prevent multiple suits by shareholders; (2) to protect corporate
creditors by ensuring that the recovery goes to the corporation; (3) to protect the interest of all
the shareholders by ensuring that the recovery goes to the corporation, rather than allowing
recovery by one or a few shareholders to the prejudice of others; and (4) to adequately
compensate injured shareholders by increasing their share values." Levy v. Reiner, 290 Ga. App.
471, 473-74, 659 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2008) (citing Thomas v. Dickson. 250 Ga. 772, 774-775, 301
S.E.2d 49 (1983); Southwest Health & Wellness v. Work. 282 Ga. App. 619, 626(2)(c), 639
S.E.2d 570 (2006)). Thus,
(a] derivative suit is brought on behalf of a corporation for harm done to it,
and any damages recovered are paid to the corporation. And although
plaintiffs may bring direct actions for injuries done to them in their
individual capacities by corporate fiduciaries, our Supreme Court has held
that to have standing to sue individually, rather than derivatively on behalf
of the corporation, the plaintiff must allege more than an injury resulting
from a wrong to the corporation. In fact, to set out an individual action,

the plaintiff must allege either a11 injury which is separate and distinct
from that suffered by other members, or a wrong involving a contractual
right of a member which exists independently of any right of the
corporation. Thus, for a plaintiff to have standing to bring an individual
action, he must be injured directly or independently of the
corporation. Furthermore, the determination of whether a claim is
derivative or direct is made by looking to what the pleader alleged, and it
is the nature of the wrong alleged and not the pleader's designation or
stated intention that controls the court's decision.
Crittenton v. Southland Owners Ass'n, Inc., 312 Ga. App. 521,524, 718 S.E.2d 839, 842-43
(2011) (internal punctuation and citations omitted; emphasis added).
Here, although the Court previously denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, finding at the
pleading stage, there "[wa]s sufficient pleading of special injury to Bronner as shareholder and
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party to the Reconciliation Agreement to allow a direct claim for fraud" to proceed, at the
summary judgment stage Plaintiff is required to point to specific evidence he was, indeed,
uniquely injured. Plaintiffs fraud claim is premised on Hardy and Packer's having allegedly
misrepresented Rainforest's financial information. However, as noted by Defendants, any
alleged misrepresentation of corporate financial records would result in harm to the corporation
and its shareholders alike, not just Bronner. Further, although Plaintiff relies on the
Reconciliation Agreement to support his fraud claim, noting the Agreement "purported to create
certain rights for Bronner that were unique to him" and claiming Hardy and Packer made
multiple misrepresentations to Bronner in relation thereto, 60 the obligations regarding financial

disclosures, e.g., to provide a "Trois Financial Report" and to calculate and establish a ''YearEnd Bonus Pool" was expressly that of Rainforest, not Hardy or Packer individually. See
Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 840, 844, 392 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1990)
("An inherent purpose of incorporation is insulation from liability. A corporation possesses a
legal existence separate and apart from that of its officers and shareholders so that the operation
of a corporate business does not render officers and shareholders personally liable for corporate
acts") (citing Raynor v. American States Ins. Co .. 176 Ga .App. 564, 565(1), 337 S.E.2d 43
(1985); Trans-State v. Barber, 170 Ga. App. 372, 374(1), 317 S.E.2d 242 (1984)).
Having considered the entire record and given all of the above, Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs fraud claim.

B.

Plaintiff's Derivative Claims
1.

6-0

Preliminary Issues

PJ's Opp. to Defs' MSJ, pp. 17-18.
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a) Ante Litem Requirement
Defendants argue the derivative claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to
satisfy the statutory ante litem requirements contained in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-742, which provides:
A shareholder may not commence a derivative proceeding until:
(1) A written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action; and
(2) Ninety days have expired from the date the demand was made unless
the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected
by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would
result by waiting for the expiration of the 90 day period.

See also Ebon Found. v. Oatman, 269 Ga. 340, 342, 498 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1998).
Here, Defendants initially provided the Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders on
May 15, 2014. Just eight days later, on May 23, 2014, Plaintiff's counsel served the Shareholder
Demand on Defendants and expressly requested a response within five days, presumably given
the impending special meeting. Defendants did not so respond or delay the special meeting, but
rather ten days later, on June 2, 2014, Defendants proceeded with the special meeting to vote on
the proposed dissolution of Rainforest, including the Board's adopted Plan of Liquidation and
Dissolution. Shortly thereafter, sometime in June, 2010, Hardy executed Articles of Dissolution
of Rainforest Films, Inc. and Rainforest Productions Holdings, Inc.
Given this timeline, Defendants' actions can only reasonably be construed as a rejection
of Plaintiff's Shareholder Demand. Moreover, in light of the liquidation plan (which included a
sale of the rights to the Rainforest name and logo to Hardy) and events occurring near in time
(including execution of a no-interest promissory note by Packer for $400,000 that was previously
undisclosed to shareholders), there is evidence that irreparable injury to the corporation would
result by waiting for the expiration of the 90 day period before bringing suit. Defendants' Motion
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for Summary Judgment on the derivative claims on the ground that Plaintiff failed to comply
with the ante litem requirement is hereby DENIE D.

b) Effect ofReconciliation Agreement 011 Derivative Claims
Defendants assert the Reconciliation Agreement bars any derivative claims premised on
purported events that took place before October 2010. Again, Defendants point to the release
clauses contained in the Reconciliation Agreement which operate to bar claims against
Rainforest Productions and its affiliates. Defendants argue even though TRF is not a named
party to the Reconciliation Agreement, it is nonetheless protected under it because it is an
affiliate and a wholly owned subsidiary of Rainforest.
As set forth in Part I(A)(l)(b)(i), supra, the Court finds the Reconciliation Agreement
and the releases contained therein are enforceable and TRF is covered under Bronner's release as
a Rainforest affiliate and subsidiary. However, the Reconciliation Agreement does not bar the
derivative claims asserted on behalf of Rainforest against TRF because Bronner's release
expressly states the release is by "Bronner, on behalf of himself and his assigns, heirs, executors,
administrators and representatives.t''" Additionally, under the "Release by Rainforest
Productions", Rainforest only "release] d]" and "full discharge[ d] Bronner and his assigns, heirs,
executors, administrators and representatives ... ", not Defendants.62 Insofar as Rainforest did not
release any claims or causes of action against Defendants, the releases in the Reconciliation
Agreement do not bar Plaintiff from bringing claims derivatively on behalf of Rainforest against
Defendants. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds the Reconciliation
Agreement bars plaintiffs derivative claims is hereby DENlED.
c) Doctrine of unclean hands
61
62

Reconciliation Agreement, §1.3.
Reconciliation Agreement,§ l.4.
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Defendants assert Plaintiff's equitable claims and theories of recovery (e.g., unjust

enrichment, quantum meruit, and to pierce the corporate veil to assert claims against Hardy and
Packer, individually) are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.
Under that doctrine, "[h]e who would have equity must do equity and
must give effect to all equitable rights of the other party respecting the
subject matter of the action." O.C.G.A. § 23-1-10. "The unclean-hands
maxim [refers] to an inequity which infects the cause of action so that to
entertain it would be violative of conscience." (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Partain v. Maddox, 227 Ga. 623, 637(4)(a), 182 S.E.2d 450
(1971). To assert the doctrine successfully, a party must demonstrate that
the wrongdoing is directly related to the claim against which unclean
hands is asserted. Adams v. Crowell. 157 Ga. App. 576, 577(2), 278
S.E.2d 151 ( 1981 ); see also Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator
Co .. 290 U.S. 240, 245, 54 S.Ct. 146, 78 L.Ed. 293 (1933).
Matrix Fin. Servs .. Inc. v. Dean, 288 Ga. App. 666, 669-70, 655 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2007); Roach
v. Roach, 327 Ga. App. 513, 514--15, 759 S.E.2d 587, 589 (2014) ("It is well established ... that
equity is not available to one who lacks clean hands as to the relief being sought").
Defendants assert Plaintiffs wrongful conduct, including his alleged "wrongful corporate
behavior, breach of the Reconciliation Agreement, and deposition perjury", undercut and
preclude his equitable claims and theories of relief. The parties have presented an exhaustive
record wherein they accuse each other of all manner of personal and corporate misdeeds,
allegations which are often hotly disputed. Although many of the allegations are extraneous and
unrelated to the equitable claims at issue, others are not. In light of the record before the Court
and construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor as the non-movant,
the Court cannot find Plaintiff's equitable claims and theories are barred as a matter of law
under the doctrine of unclean hands. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this ground
is hereby DENIED.
2.

Waste of Corporate Assets and Misappropriation of Corporate Assets
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Plaintiff asserts derivative claims for "waste of corporate assets" and "misappropriation
of corporate assets" against Hardy and Packer on the sam e grounds, as to both claims citing the
"[f]raudulent authorization of paym ent of excessive salaries to themselves"; "[f]raudulent
authorization of excessive compensations to themselves"; "[f]raudulent authorization and
paym ent of a $400,000 loan to Defendant Packer"; and "[f]raudulent grant and conveyance of
the Company's intellectual property to Defendant Hardy." 63 Defendants assert they are entitled

to summary judgment with respect to these claims because Rainforest received adequate
compensation for the subject transactions, and Plaintiff cannot establish the unauthorized
assumption of Rainforest's assets.
"The directors and managers of a corporation who control and have charge of its effects
are bound to care for its property and manage its affairs in good faith, and for a violation of these
duties resulting in waste of its assets and injury to the property they are liable to account the
same as other trustees." Chalverus v. Wilson Mfg. Co., 212 Ga. 612, 613, 94 S.E.2d 736, 738
(1956) ( citing Baker v. Sutton, 47 Ga.App. 176, 170 S.E. 95 (1933). See also Pelletier v. Schultz,
157 Ga. App. 64, 66, 276 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1981) ("The relationship of a corporate officer or
director to the corporation and its stockholders is fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary, which requires that
they act in utmost good faith .... Directors and officers in the management and use of corporate
property in which they act as fiduciaries and are trustees are charged with serving the interests of
the corporation as well as those of all the stockholders'') (citations omitted).

Cf In re The Home

Depot, Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig .. 223 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2016) ("Under
Delaware law, corporate waste is "an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of

63
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ordinary, sound judgm ent could conclude that the corporation has received adequate
consideration").
Here, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to judgm ent as a matter of law on the
portion of Plaintiff's waste of corporate assets/misappropriation of corporate assets claims
premised on the allegedly fraudulent "authorization of paym ent of excessive salaries to
themselves" and the "grant and conveyance of the Company's intellectual property to Defendant
Hardy."

64

The only salary referenced in the record is the $175,000.00 base salary set forth in the

Reconciliation Agreement as compensation for the services provided by Hardy and Packer.65
Insofar as the foregoing salaries were approved by the Board of Directors (Bronner, Hardy, and
Packer) and the majority of shareholders (again Bronner, Hardy, and Packer, collectively
representing 94.4% of outstanding shares of Rainforest common stock), the Court fails to discern
and Plaintiff does not explain how these salaries support a claim for corporate waste and/or
misappropriation of corporate assets.66 Similarly, the dissolution of Rainforest pursuant to an
adopted Plan of Liquidation and Dissolution that was approved by the holders of over 67% of the
outstanding share of Rainforest common stock provides no support for the claims.67
However, in light of the factual disputes in the records regarding whether Defendants
adhered to the compensation structure for Single Contractor and Joint Core Business Projects
under the Reconciliation Agreement and the vague circumstances under which that structure was
abandoned,68 the Court cannot find the corporate waste/misappropriation of corporate assets
claim premised on "excessive compensations" fails as a matter of law. Similarly, the vague
64

Complaint, ,ni 104, 120.
Reconciliation Agreement, §2.2.
66
Reconciliation Agreement, Recitals at ~I; Sbarebolder Agreement, §§ 1.1, 1.2, 1.4.
67
Shareholder Agreement, § 1.4; Defs' SMF, Ex. 0 (Correspondence and Notice of Special Meeting of
Shareholders dated May 15, 2014; Information Statement for Special Meeting of Shareholders).
68
See note 55, supra.
65
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circumstances under which Packer, unbeknownst to Bronner, "utilized $400,000.00 in Rainforest
Productions' credit over an extended period of time" for his personal benefit and then purported
to execute a no-interest promissory note several years allowing him to repay the note over the

course of two years, at least presents a jury question with respect to the corporate
waste/misappropriation of corporate assets claim.69 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED, IN PART, and DENIED, IN PART, as set forth above.
3.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

"It is well settled that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three

elements: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage
proximately caused by the breach." Engelman v. Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d
160, 166 (2017), cert. denied (Aug. 14, 2017) (citing Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 849850 (2), 670 S.E.2d 508 (2008)).
"Whether a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists is a matter for the factfinder to
decide." Benson v. McMillan, 261 Ga. App. 78, 81, 581 S.E.2d 707, 710 (2003) (citing Hanson
v. State. 232 Ga. App. 352, 354(2)(b), 501 S.E.2d 865 (1998)). See O.C.G.A. §23-2-58 ("Any
relationship shall be deemed confidential, whether arising from nature, created by law, or
resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over
the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual
confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners,
principal and agent, etc."); Wachovia Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Fallon, 299 Ga. App. 440, 448, 682
S.E.2d 657, 664 (2009) ("It is settled law that corporate officers and directors occupy a fiduciary
relationship to the corporation and its shareholders, and are held to the standard of utmost good
69
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faith and loyalty") (citing Hilb, Rogal, etc. v. Holley, 295 Ga. App. 54, 57-58(2), 670 S.E.2d 874
(2008)). See also O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-830(a), 14-2-842(a) (providing that corporate officers and

directors shall discharge their duties "in good faith and with the degree of care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances").
Here, Plaintiff alleges Packer and Hardy "breached their fiduciary duties of good faith,
loyalty, oversight, and supervision" owed to Rainforest. Specifically, he asserts they breached
"their duty of good faith by failing to act in the best interests of the Company and its
Shareholders by diverting business opportunities from the Company to their respective affiliated
and self-owned business ventures"; breached "their duty of loyalty by self-dealing and engaging
self-affiliated companies to provide services to the Company for compensation set by
themselves"; and breached "their duty of oversight and supervision by failing to take time to
consider corporation actions, make deliberate decisions after candid discussions, and prepare and
provide consistent and current financial reports."70 Plaintiff asserts this claim derivatively on
behalf of Rainforest, alleging Hardy and Packer's conduct "had the effect of diverting Company
revenues and assets, destabilizing the financial condition of the Company, and reducing the
profit and profitability of the Company'' such that "Rainforest and its shareholders have been
harmed."71 The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment as to this claim.
a) Statute of limitations with respect to breach offiduciary duties claims
"Georgia has no specific statute of limitation for breach of fiduciary duty claims. Instead,
we examine the injury alleged and the conduct giving rise to the claim to determine the
appropriate statute of limitation." Godwin v. Mizpah Farms, LLLP, 330 Ga. App. 31, 38, 766
S.E.2d 497, 504 (2014) (citing Reaugh v. Inner Harbour Hosp., Ltd .. 214 Ga. App. 259, 260(1),
70
71
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447 S.E.2d 617 (1994). The Georgia Court of Appeals has held that breach of fiduciary duty
claims arising out of written contracts are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See
O.C.G.A. §9-3-24. See, e.g., Niloy & Rohan, LLC v. Sechler, 335 Ga. App. 507, 512, 782 S.E.2d
293, 298 (2016) (holding that six-year statute of limitations applies to breach of fiduciary duty
claims arising out of operating agreement); Godwin, 330 Ga. App. at 38 (applying six-year
statute of limitation for breach of simple contracts applies to breach of fiduciary duty claims
arising under a limited partnership agreement).
Insofar as the fiduciary duties owed by Hardy and Packer arise from their status as
officers and directors of Rainforest, relationships generally governed by the written contracts
discussed herein, the Court finds the six-year statute of limitations period applicable to simple
written contracts applies to the breach of the fiduciary duties claim. See Niloy & Rohan, LLC,

supra; Godwin, supra. For the reasons set forth in Parts I(A)(l )(a) and l(A)(2)(a), supra, the
Court further finds the breach of fiduciary duties claims are time barred to the extent premised on
events that occurred before June 20, 2008.

b) Breach offiduciary duties claim arising after June 2008
The Court finds there is at least some evidence in the record supporting the breach of
fiduciary duties claim. With respect to Hardy and Packer's decisions and conduct concerning the
loan-out of their services to third parties and compensation, although the 2010 Reconciliation
Agreement set forth a specific compensation structure, there is evidence in the record of a
purported "2012 agreement" whereby it appears Hardy and Packer unilaterally decided to change
the established compensation structure and forego a salary from Rainforest in favor of pursuing
television and film projects independent of Rainforest." Further, Hardy and Packer's conduct

72
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surrounding the $400,000.00 in Rainforest credit utilized by Packer for his personal benefit and
repaid years later through a no-interest promissory note at a time when Rain forest was allegedly
stru ggling financially provides at least some evidence of breach of fiduciary duty sufficient to
withstand summary judgm ent.
Although Defendants assert their actions are protected under the business judgm ent rule,
the Court is not persuaded.
[T]he business judgm ent rule is a settled part of our common law in
Georgia, and it generally precludes claims against officers and directors
for their business decisions that sound in ordinary negligence, except to
the extent that those decisions are shown to have been made without
deliberation, without the requisite diligence to ascertain and assess the
facts and circumstances upon which. the decisions are based, or ill bad

faith. Put another way, the business judgment rule at common law
forecloses claims against officers and directors that sound in ordinary
negligence when the alleged negligence concerns only the wisdom of their
judgment, but it does not absolutely foreclose such claims to the extent
that a business decision did not involve "judgment" because it was made
in a way that did not comport with the duty to exercise good faith and
ordinary care.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579, 585-86, 761 S.E.2d 332, 338 (2014)
(emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff asserts Hardy and Packer's decisions regarding changes of how they
handled their salary and compensation for loan-out projects occurred without notice to or
authorization from shareholders and were not disclosed to shareholders until years later in
2014.73 When questioned about what meetings, agreements, or other corporate formalities
documented the change, Hardy was unable to provide specifics.74 Similarly, the $400,000.00
73

Pl's Response to Defs' SMF, ,it 15.
Hardy Depo. (Jan. 29, 2018), pp. 280-281, 284-286, 288-289, 293-294. Notably, the Reconciliation
Agreement expressly states: "Use of Rainforest Films and Other Operating Entities. Rainforest Productions shall
continue to use Rainforest Films or another operating entity of or controlled by Rainforest Productions to engage in
all Core Business Projects in which either of the Founders receives any compensation or other payment for his
services as a result of such Core Business Project. No compensation or other payment may he made to either ofthe
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Rainforest credit used by Packer occurred in 2009-2010, but was not disclosed to shareholders
(other than Hardy) and arr angements for repaym ent were not form alized until 2014, shortly
before pursuing dissolution of Rainforest. 75 In short, the Court finds there is evidence in the

record to rebut the presumption Hardy and Packer acted in good faith and ordinary care.
However, with respect to Plaintiff's allegations that Hardy and Packer breached their
duties of good faith and/or loyalty by diverting business opportunities from Rainforest, the
corporate opportunity doctrine bars Plaintiff's claim.
O.C.G.A. §14-2-831(a)(l)(C) authorizes a derivative proceeding to be brought against a
director or officer for "[t]he appropriation, in violation of his or her duties, of any business
opportunity of the corporation."
[The Supreme Court of Georgia] bas adopted a two-step process for
determining the ultimate question of when liability for wrongful
appropriation of a business opportunity should be imposed.
First, a court must determine whether the appropriated opportunity was in
fact a business opportunity rightfully belonging to the corporation. If a
court finds that the business opportunity was not a corporate opportunity,
the directors or officers who pursued the opportunity for personal benefit
are immune from liability. However, if the court finds that the business
opportunity was a bona fide corporate opportunity, the court must
determine whether the corporate official violated a fiduciary duty in
appropriating that opportunity. Regarding the second step[,] ... liability
should not be imposed upon the acquiring officer if the evidence
establishes that his acquisition did not violate his fiduciary duties of
loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing toward the corporation.

Founders on account of any service performed by a Founder with respect to any Core Business Project, except as
provided ill this Agreement or unless suck compensation or other payment is approved by the Board of Directors
of Rainforest Productions ;,, a vote which the Bronner Director joins" Id. at §2. l (bold and italicized emphasis
added).
15
Packer Depo. (May 5, 2018), pp. 53-70.
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Bob Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Norm Webster & Assocs., Inc., 251 Ga. App. 56, 61, 553
S.E.2d 365, 369 (2001) (citing Southeast Consultants v. McCrary Engineering Corp., 246 Ga.
503,273 S.E.2d 112 (1980)). Thus,
[t]he threshold question is whether an opportunity presented to a corporate
fiduciary is a "corporate" opportunity. That factual determination is to be
made from all the relevant facts and circumstances. The burden of proof
with regard to the threshold question rests upon the party attacking the
acquisition. Liability is not to be imposed upon the fiduciary unless the
evidence establishes that the fiduciary violated his fiduciary duties of
loyalty, good faith and fair dealing toward the corporation. Thus, the
second step involves close scrutiny of the equitable considerations existing
prior to, at the time of, and following the officer's acquisition. The burden
of proof on the questions of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty is placed
upon the officer who appropriated the opportunity.
Bob Davidson & Assocs., Inc., 25 l Ga. App. at 61-62 ( citing Phoenix Airline Services v. Metro
Airlines, 260 Ga. 584, 587(2), 397 S.E.2d 699 (1990).
Importantly, "[a] business opportunity arises from a 'beachhead' consisting of a legal or
equitable interest or an 'expectancy' growing out of a pre-existing right or relationship." Bob
Davidson & Assocs., Inc., 251 Ga. App. at 62. See, e.g., United Seal & Rubber v. Bunting, 248
Ga. 814,815,285 S.E.2d 721 (1982) (dealings with certain customers did not amount to business
opportunities, finding that although company had long standing dealings with customers whose
sales accounted for a large portion of its income, no contractual arrangement existed between the
company and customers, the customers had no exclusive arrangement with the company and "the
opportunity suggested was an ongoing [one] with no finite aspect"); Ins. Indus. Consultants, LLC
v. Alford, 294 Ga. App. 747, 751, 669 S.E.2d 724, 729 (2008) (no business opportunity where
the business relationships at issue were with prospective clients the plaintiff "hoped to retain or
acquire business with, or with whom it had to annually renew contracts" such that "no
contractual arrangement between them existed" and "they were not the exclusive customers of
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[plaintiff]"); Mau, Inc. v. Human Techs., lnc., 274 Ga. App. 891, 894, 619 S.E.2d 394, 397
(2005) (holding employer did not have reasonable interest or expectancy in business accounts
where former employees stated they did nothing on the employer's time or with employer's
resources to further their planned, separate venture and employer merely speculated that it should
have gotten business from business accounts before former employees left company to start their
own company).
Here, Plaintiff only generally asserts Defendants usurped Rainforest's corporate
opportunities. Plaintiff appears to take the position any and every film or television project
Hardy and Packer worked on constituted a "business opportunity" to which Rainforest had a
legal or equitable interest or expectancy. However, the Reconciliation Agreement contemplated
loan out arrangements regarding Hardy and Packer's services and did not preclude Hardy and
Packer from engaging in work outside of Rainforest To the extent Plaintiff asserts various
projects Hardy and Packer worked on outside of Rainforest were usurped business opportunities,
Plaintiff fails to point to evidence there was a pre-existing right or relationship of a finite and
specific nature sufficient to constitute a Rainforest business opportunity beyond speculation and
aspirations.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the breach of fiduciary duties
claim is, thus, GRANTED, IN PART, and DENIED, IN PART, as set forth above.

4.

Lack of Candor and Gross Mismanagement

Plaintiff asserts a derivative claim on behalf of Rainforest against Hardy and Packer for
"lack of candor". According to the Complaint, "[b]y reason of the foregoing acts, practices and
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course of conduct7 6

[]

Hardy and Packer have knowingly or recklessly and in bad faith failed to

exercise due care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations to Rainforest and/or
its shareholders.?" He further asserts: "Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Only through
the exercise of this Court's equitable powers can Rainforest and its shareholders be fully
protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which [) Hardy's and Packer's actions
threaten and continue to inflict."78 Plaintiff also asserts a derivative claim against Hardy and
Packer for "gross mismanagement", alleging they "abandoned and abdicated their
responsibilities and fiduciary duties with regard to prudently managing the assets and business of
Rainforest. "79 In moving for summary judgment, Defendants assert these claims all "sound[] in
fiduciary duty" and are rneritless because Hardy and Packer acted with the requisite deliberation
and diligence when exercising business judgment, complied with prevailing corporate practices,
and exercised rational business judgment.
The Court finds the "lack of candor" and "gross mismanagement" claims are duplicative
of the breach of fiduciary duties claims insofar as they appear to be predicated on the same
underlying conduct. Notably, Plaintiff did not explain, support, or even address these specific
claims in responding to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. However, on summary
judgment "[ o ]nee the movant has made a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw, the burden shifts to the respondent to come forward with rebuttal evidence." Kelly
v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga. App. 391, 392-93, 469 S.E.2d 469, 471 (1996) (citing Ellis v.
Curtis-Toledo, Inc .• 204 Ga. App. 704, 705, 420 S.E.2d 756 (1992)). See O.C.G.A. §9-11-56(e)

76

Plaintiff presumably refers to the prior section of the pleading wherein Plaintiff asserts a derivative claim
on behalf of Rainforest against Hardy and Packer for breach of fiduciary duty. See Complaint, ~~ 91-95.
77
Complaint, il 97.
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("When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this Code section,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him"). See also Pfeiffer v. Georgia Dep't ofTransp.. 275 Ga.

827, 828-29, 573 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2002) ("[I]n responding to a motion for summary judgment,
plaintiffs have a statutory duty 'to produce whatever viable theory of recovery they might have
or run the risk of an adjudication on the merits of their case.' The same burden is placed on the
parties with regard to factual issues") (citing Summer-Minter & Assocs., Inc. v. Giordano, 231
Ga. 601, 606, 203 S.E.2d 173, 177 (1974)). Having considered the record, the Court finds
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the ''lack of candor" and
"gross mismanagement" claims. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby GRANTED as to the foregoing claims.
5.

Abuse of Control

Plaintiff asserts a derivative claim on behalf of Rainforest for "abuse of control" against
Hardy and Packer alleging they ''have entrenched themselves in their positions of power and
control at [Rainforest] and continue to receive the substantial benefits, salaries and emoluments
associated with their positions at the Company" and that they "have, and continue, to operate
Rainforest for their personal gains and goals and to the detriment of its shareholders."80 Plaintiff
further claims Hardy and Packer's "conduct constitutes an abuse of their positions of trust,
control and influence over Rainforest."81

80
81
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Defendants argue they are entitled to a judgm ent as a matter of law as to the "abuse of
control" claim because no such cause of action exists under Georgia law and to the extent it is
premised on control and domination in the context of futility, Georgia courts have declined to
judicially create an exception to the ante litem demand requirements. See Pinnacle Benning LLC

v. Clark Realty Capital, LLC, 314 Ga. App. 609, 615-16, 724 S.E.2d 894, 900 (2012) ("And
today,

the

procedures

to

bring

corporations, nonprofit corporations, and

derivative

actions

in

relation

limited-liability companies all

to

business

contain a similar

demand requirement, with no futility exception. Thus, because we find the language of our
statute and the intent of the General Assembly clear and unambiguous, we will not judicially
create a futility exception out of whole cloth ... ").
Again, in responding to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff did not
explain, support, or even address his abuse of control claim such that the Court is left to
speculate as to the legal and factual basis existing in the record for the claim. As noted above,
"[ o ]nee the movant has made a prirna facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, the burden shifts to the respondent to come forward with rebuttal evidence." Kelly, 220 Ga.
App. at 392-93. Insofar as Plaintiff has not identified any cognizable theory of recovery or
specific facts or evidence of record in support of his "abuse of control" claim, the Court is
compelled to find that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden on summary judgment "showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. §9-11-56(e); Pfeiffer, 275 Ga. at 828-29.Thus,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.82

82

Again, to the extent the claim is premised on Plaintiff's allegations that Hardy and Packer generally abused
their positions of authority as officer and directors of Rainforest for their personal benefit, the claim appears
duplicative of the breach of fiduciary duties and/or waste claims.
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6.

Unjust enrichment

Plaintiff has asserted a derivative claim on behalf of Rainforest against Packer and Hardy,
alleging only they "have been and will continue to be unjustly enriched at the expense of and to
the detriment of the Company."83 Complaint, ,I 107.
"The concept of unjust enrichment in law is premised upon the principle that a party
cannot induce, accept, or encourage another to furnish or render something of value to such party
and avoid payment for the value received .... " Scott v. Mamari Corp., 242 Ga. App. 455,458, 530
S.E.2d 208, 212 (2000) (citing Reidling v. Holcomb. 225 Ga.App. 229, 232(2), 483 S.E.2d 624
(1997)).
Unjust enrichment is an equitable concept and applies when as a matter of
fact there is no legal contract, but when the party sought to be charged has
been conferred a benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment
which the benefitted party equitably ought to return or compensate for. A
claim for unjust e11ric/1111e11t is not a tort, but a11 a/tentative theory of
recovery if a contract claim fails.

Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, 347 Ga. App. 13, 21, 815 S.E.2d 639, 647
(2018), reconsideration denied (July 16, 2018) (emphasis added). See, e.g., id. (affirming
dismissal of unjust enrichment claim where plaintiffs "did not plead unjust enrichment as an
alternate theory of recovery based on a failed contract"); Cash v. LG Elecs., Inc., 342 Ga. App.
735, 742, 804 S.E.2d 713, 718 (2017) (affirming summary judgment to defendant where
plaintiffs "did not plead unjust enrichment as an alternate theory of recovery based on a failed
contract"); Wachovia Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Fallon, 299 Ga. App. 440, 449, 682 S.E.2d 657, 665
(2009) (holding unjust enrichment claim fails as matter of law where it is asserted as a separate
tort and not as an alternative recovery for a failed contract).

83
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Here, vanous contracts govern the parties' relationship, including the Reconciliation
Agreement and Shareholders Agreement. Insofar as there are enforceable contracts governing the
parti es' business dealings, such precludes recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff predicates the unjust enrichm ent claim on Hardy and Packer's
alleged "wrongful [fraudulent] conduct and fiduciary breaches" as described in the Complaint,
Plaintiff is improperly attempting to assert the claim as a separate tort rather than as an
alternative recovery for a failed contract. Collins, 347 Ga. App. at 21; Cash, 342 Ga. App. at 742;
Wachovia Ins. Servs., Inc., 299 Ga. App. at 449. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summ ary
Judgm ent is GRAN TED with respect to the unjust enrichment claim.84

7.

Quantum Meruit

Plaintiff alleges "the initiation and prosecution of this action have conferred a substantial
and common benefit to Rainforest and its shareholders through the implementation of structural
and corporate governance changes demanded by Plaintiff' such that he "is entitled [to]
reasonable compensation for his efforts, expenses and costs" under a theory of quantum meruit.85
"Ordinarily, when one renders service or transfers property which is valuable to another,
which the latter accepts, a promise is implied to pay the reasonable value thereof" O.C.G.A. §92-7. "The theory of quantum meruit is ... an equitable principle ... based upon the premise that,
'when one renders service or transfers property which is valuable to another, which the latter
accepts, a promise is implied to pay the reasonable value thereof."' City of Baldwin v. Woodard

84

Additionally, the unjust enrichment claim is time barred to the extent based on events occurring before June
20, 2010. See Parts l(A)(l)(a) and I(A)(2)(a), supra. See also Bums v. Dees. 252 Ga. App. 598, 607, 557 S.E.2d 32,
39 (200 l) (applying four year statute of limitations to unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claim, citing O.C.G .A.
§9-3-26).
85
Complaint, ,i,i 114-115.
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& Curran, Inc., 293 Ga. 19, 23, 743 S.E.2d 381,385 (2013) (citing Georgia Dept. of Community
Health v. Data Inquiry, LLC. 313 Ga. App. 683,687, 722 S.E.2d 403 (2012)).
However, "[i]n Georgia, 'attorney fees are not generally recoverable as damages absent
an express provision in a contract or a statutory mandate.?' Doss & Assocs. v. First Am. Title
Ins. Co., 325 Ga. App. 448, 464, 754 S.E.2d 85, 98 (2013) (quoting George L. Smith, etc. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 255 Ga. App. 643, 644, 566 S.E.2d 361 (2002)). See O.C.G.A. §13-<5-l l
("The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages ... ");
Rothenberg v. Sec. Mgmt. Co., 736 F.2d 1470, 1471 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Under the traditional
'American rule,' attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or
enforceable contract providing therefor") (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co .. 386 U.S. 714, 717, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407, 18 L.Ed.2d 475,478 (1967)).
With respect to the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses arising out of a
derivative action, O.C.G.A. § 14-2-746 provides:
On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may:
(1) Order the corporation to pay the plaintiffs reasonable expenses
(including attorneys' fees) incurred in the proceeding if it finds that the
proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation; or
(2) Order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses
(including attorneys' fees) incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds
that the proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable
cause or for an improper purpose.
As noted in the Comments to O.C.G.A. §14-2-746, the statute "is intended to be a codification of
existing case law." Id. at i]l (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)).
Insofar as attorney's fees and litigation expenses are generally not recoverable absent a
contractual or statutory provision and, here, O.C.G.A. §14-2-746 governs the payment of
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expenses arising from derivative proceedings such as the case at bar, the Court finds Plaintiffs
unjust enrichm ent claim fails as a matter of law. See O.C.G.A. §23-1-3 ("Equity jurisdiction is

established and allowed for the protection and relief of parties where, from any peculiar
circumstances, the operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from
anticipated wrong or relieving for injuries done"); O.C.G.A. §23-1-4 ("Equity will not taJce
cognizance of a plain legal right where an adequate and complete remedy is provided by law");
Southern Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Health Care Capital Consol., Inc., 273 Ga. 834, 835, 545
S.E.2d 882, 885 (2001) ("A party cannot resort to equity if an adequate legal remedy is
available") (citing Besser v. Rule. 270 Ga. 473, 510 S.E.2d 530 (1999)). Accordingly,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.
8.

Receivership

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he is "unable to fully protect his or (Rainforest's]
rights absent emergency relief and there is a manifest danger of loss, destruction and material
injury to Plaintiffs interest" such that "(a] receiver should be appointed immediately and without
notice to [] Hardy and Packer to prevent them from continuing to sell, exchange, encumber,
pledge, dispose of or otherwise transfer any interest in [Rainforest's] assets."86
O.C.G.A. §9-8-1 sets forth the grounds for the appointment of a receiver:
When any fund or property is in litigation and the rights of either or both
parties cannot otherwise be fully protected or when there is a fund or
property having no one to manage it, a receiver of the same may be
appointed by the judge of the superior court having jurisdiction thereof.
As summarized by the Supreme Court of Georgia:
The purpose of the receivership is to preserve the property which is the
subject of the litigation, and to provide full protection to the parties' rights
to the property until a final disposition of the issues. Richardson v.
86

Complaint, ,n[ L 17-118.
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Roland[, 267 Ga. 34, 35(3), 472 S.E.2d 301 (1996)]; Conner v. Yawn, 200

Ga. 500, 506, 3 7 S.E.2d 541 (1946). But the court's power to appoint a
receiver should be prudently and cautiously exercised and should not be
resorted to except in clear and urgent cases. Kruzel v. Leeds Building
Products, 266 Ga. 765, 767(1), 470 S.E.2d 882 (1996), citing Parrish v.
Rigell, 183 Ga. 218, 224(1), 188 S.E. 15 (1936). This is so regardless of
the apparent equity of the complainant. Conner v. Yawn at 506, 3 7 S.E.2d
541.
Chrysler Ins. Co. v. Dorminey. 271 Ga. 555, 556, 522 S.E.2d 232, 233-34 (1999). See O.C.G.A.
§9-8-4 ("The power of appointing receivers should be prudently and cautiously exercised and
except in clear and urgent cases should not be resorted to"); Templeman v. Templeman, 173 Ga.
743, 161 S.E. 261, 262 (1931) ("The appointment of a receiver is a harsh remedy, to which resort
should not be had, except when the interests of creditors are exposed to manifest perif')
(emphasis added) (citing Dixon v. Tucker, 167 Ga. 783, 146 S.E. 736, 737 (1929)); Patel v.
Patel, 280 Ga. 292, 293-94, 627 S.E.2d 21, 23 (2006) ("The high prerogative act of taking
property out of the owner's hands and putting it in pound, under the order of a judge, ought not to
be taken, except to prevent manifest wrong imminently impending") (emphasis added). See also
Treu v. Humanism Inv., Inc., 284 Ga. 657, 660, 670 S.E.2d 409, 411 (2008) (holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not appoint a receiver, reasoning that there was
no showing that an appointment of a receiver would reverse the tax implications associated with
the choice to establish a corporation as a "C" corporation instead of a partnership).
Here, insofar as it is undisputed that Rainforest has been dissolved in accordance with the
requisite majority of voting shareholders, there is no need to prevent any manifest wrong
imminently impending with respect to Rainforest and the grounds for the appointment of a
receiver simply do not exist. The adopted Plan for Liquidation and Dissolution sets forth the
approved procedure for effectuating the dissolution of Rainforest, including the winding up of its
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affairs and liquidation of its assets. 87 In this regard, a Liquidation Trust was established and a

Liquidation Trustee was appointed.88 In short, the claim for appointment of a receiver to manage
the affairs of Rainforest is moot and any such appointment would be of no practical benefit to the
parties. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.
9.

Punitive Damages

"Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice,
fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of
conscious indifference to consequences." O.C.G.A. §51-12-5.1. "Ordinarily, the imposition of
punitive damages is a question for the jury." Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms,
LLC, 347 Ga. App. 381, 389, 819 S.E.2d 666, 673 (2018) (citing Baumann v. Snider, 243 Ga.
App. 526, 530 (3), 532 S.E.2d 468 (2000).
In light of the Court's rulings herein and insofar as tort claims survive for trial, the Court
finds the question of whether the remaining tort claims are of a sufficiently aggravated nature to
warrant punitive damages is a question for the jury. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
with respect to the punitive damage claim is DENIED.

87

Defs' SMF, Ex. 0 (Correspondence and Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders dated May 15, 2014;
Information Statement for Special Meeting of Shareholders).
88
Defs' SMF, Ex. DD (Rainforest Productions, Inc. Establishment of Liquidation Trust and Appointment of
Liquidation Trustee).
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II.

COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Counterclaimants (Hardy, Packer, and Rainforest) and Bronner have cross-moved for

summary judgment with respect to Counterclaimants' claims against Bronner for: (I) breach of
the non-disparagement provision in the Reconciliation Agreement; (2) defamation; and (3) unjust
enrichment. The Court addresses each claim in turn below.
A.

Breach of Non-Disparagement Provision

Counterclaimants allege Bronner breached the non-disparagement provision contained in
the Reconciliation Agreement. As noted above, "[t]he elements of a breach of contract claim in
Georgia are the (1) breach and the (2) resultant damages (3) to the party who has the right to
complain about the contract being broken." Norton v. Budget Rent A Car System. Inc., 307 Ga.
App. 501, 502, 705 S.E.2d 305 (2010). See, e.g., Eichelkraut v. Camp, 236 Ga. App. 721, 513
S.E.2d 267 (1999) (holding unprompted letters undisputedly authored by former employees
which accused employer of ethical violations and stated that criminal investigation of employer
was underway was on its face disparaging and violated "non-disparagement" clause of employer
and employees' settlement agreement from prior litigation)
In the case at bar, the non-disparagement provision in the Reconciliation Agreement
states in relevant part:
"None of Bronner, the Founders, and Rainforest Productions (or
any direct or indirect subsidiary or other affiliated entity of
Rainforest Productions and any employee, officer, director or
agreement of any of the foregoing) shall knowingly or
intentionally take any action at any time for the purpose of
damaging, discrediting, or otherwise injuring the goodwill, esteem,
or reputation of any other party hereto. Without limiting the
foregoing, no party shall make, at any time, any false misleading,
or disparaging statement about any other party hereto with respect
to such party's past, current, or future involvement in Rainforest

Bronner v. Hardy, et al., CAFN 2014CV248023
Order on Pending Motions for Summary Judgment

47

productions or any aspect of Rainforest Productions' business or
operations ... " 89

Counterclaimants allege Bronner breached the foregoing provision by making
"disparaging remarks about the Rainforest Parties with the purpose of damaging, discrediting or
otherwise injuring the goodwill, esteem, or reputation of the Rainforest Parties [Rainforest,
Hardy, and Packer], disparaging the Rainforest Parties' past and current involvement in
Rainforest, and disparaging aspects of Rainforest's business operations.v'" In moving for
summary judgment as to this claim, Counterclaimants argue Bronner "engag[ ed] in a public
smear campaign" by allegedly directing Jacky Jasper to publish false, disparaging, and
defamatory statements concerning Packer on his website, HollywoodStreetKings.com, including
various articles alleging Packer had "ripped off' investors.91

In cross-moving for summary

judgment, Bronner argues Defendants' non-performance of certain aspects of the Reconciliation
Agreement bars Defendants' claim for breach of the non-disclosure provision, and further asserts
that Plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence that he directed Jasper's actions.
The Court finds material questions of fact remain with respect to this claim. As outlined
in Part I(A)( I )(b)(i), supra, the Court has found the Reconciliation Agreement generally

enforceable. It is true that under Georgia law, ''[i]f the nonperformance of a party to a contract is
caused by the conduct of the opposite party, such conduct shall excuse the other party from
performance" See O.C.G.A. § 13-4-23. However, to constitute a defense in this action, Bronner's
nonperformance must have been caused by the conduct of Counterclaimants which made his
performance useless or impossible. Ott v. Vineville Mkt., Ltd., 203 Ga. App. 80, 80(1), 416

89

Reconciliation Agreement,§ 3.1 (emphasis added).

90

Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim.rf 68.
Counterclaimants' SMF, Ex. B (Packer Aff.) at Ex. 9 (Jasper articles).

91
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S.E.2d 362 (1992). Nothing in this record, however, raises the issue that Counterclaim ants made
Bronner's perform ance useless or impossible. See also Sheridan v. Crown Capital Corp., 251 Ga.

App. 314,318,554 S.E.2d 296,300 (2001) ("The law favors conditions to be subsequent rather
than precedent and to be remediable by damages rather than by forfeiture") (citing Fulton Cty. v.
Collum Properties, Inc., 193 Ga. App. 774, 775, 388 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1989)); O.C.G.A. §13-3-4.
Further, a jury question remains as to what involvement Bronner had, if any, in Jasper's
publication of allegedly defamatory articles concerning Packer. There is at best conflicting
evidence in the record related to this claim, including that Jasper contacted Bronner to get an
92

interview regarding this litigation and Bronner merely directed him to the Complaint,

although

one article cites to an "exclusive[]" interview with the "spokesperson for the investors" and
another curiously includes the Mission Statement of Bronner's company, Brother Brothers'";
Jasper communicated with Mariellen Ballier (Bronner' assistant at Bronner Brothers and
Director of Operations of Upscale Magazine) in January 2017 regarding "free content for
Upscale Magazine for [a] 30-day trial period", but the offer was declined,94 although Jasper avers
that Bronner at one point engaged his company "to commission a celebrity-endorsed digitization
campaign to benefit Upscale Magazine'I"; notwithstanding Bronner's testimony that he did not
previously communicate with Jasper, there are emails from 2015-2016 that suggest that Jasper
sent articles concerning Packer to email addresses that appear to be associated with Bronner
and/or Upscale Magazine". Taken as a whole and construing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties as to the cross92

Bronner Depo. (Jan. 26, 2017), pp. 243-246.
Counterclaimants' SMF, Ex. B (Packer Aff.) at Ex. 9 (Jasper articles).
94
Ballier Depo. (Jul. 20, 2017), pp. 38-45.
95
Counterclaimants' SMF, Ex. F (Jasper a/k/a Sean Merrick Aff.) at ,rE.
96
BaUier Depo. 38:7-23, 63: 19-25, 64: 1-10, 68:23-25, 69:1-6, 83: 1-14, 92: 16-25, 93:1-8, 93:13-19, 94:1-23,
104:5-25, 105: 1-25.
93

Bronner v. Hardy, et al., CAFN 2014CV248023
Order on Pending Motions for Summary Judgment

49

motions for summary judgm ent, respectively, the foregoing falls short of establishing that
Bronner directed or controlled Jasper's action as a matter of law.97

Given the above, Counterclaimants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff
Bronner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to this claim are both DENIED.
B.

Defamation

"Generally, there are four elements in a cause of action for defamation: (1) a false and
defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third
party; (3) fault by the defendant amounting at least to negligence; and (4) special harm or the
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm." Renton v. Watson, 319 Ga.App. 896,
900, 739 S.E.2d 19, 24 (2013) (citations omitted).
Two defamation actions exist under Georgia law: libel and slander. "A libel is a false and
malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure
the reputation of the person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. O.C.G.A. §
51-5-1. The publication of the libelous matter is essential to recovery. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-l(b).
Slander or oral defamation consists in relevant part of "making charges against another in
reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein." O.C.G.A. § 51-54(3). The elements of both types of defamation are: (1) a false and defamatory statement
concerning the plaintiff (or in this case, the counterclaimants); (2) an unprivileged
communication to a third party; (3) fault by the defendant amounting at least to negligence; and

97

To the extent Bronner alleges the disparaging statements in the Jasper articles constitute inadmissible
hearsay and moves to strike same from the record, only out of court statements "offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted" constitute hearsay. O.C.G.A. §24-8-80 I (c). Although the Jasper articles cannot properly
be considered to establish the truth of the statements contained therein, they may be properly considered as
establishing publication if the allegedly disparaging/defamatory statements.
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(4) special harm or the actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm . Infinite
Energy, Inc. v. Pardue, 310 Ga. App. 355,356, 713 S.E.2d 456 (2011).
In moving for summ ary judgment with respect to this claim Plaintiff contends the statute
of limi tations bars Counterclaimants' defamation claims premised on the Jasper articles. The
Court disagrees. The statute of limi tations for a defamation claim is one year. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
("injuries to the reputation ... shall be brought within one year after the right of action accrues").
A defamation claim accrues at the time of the alleged defamatory acts regardless of whether or
not the claimant has knowledge of the act or acts at the time of their occurrence. Cunnin gham v.
JohnJ. Harte Associates, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 774,282 S.E.2d 219 (1981).
Here, Counterclaimants first asserted their defamation claim in Defendants' Verified
Answer and Defendants Robert E. Hardy, II, William E. Packer, Jr., and Rainforest Productions
Holdings, lnc.'s Counterclaim Against Bernard H. Bronner, which was filed on July 30, 2014,
and amended on October 2, 2014.98 In both filings Counterclaimants expressly allege that

"Bronner and/or his agents have made and continue to make false and defamatory remarks, both
orally and in writing or print, to third parties, including media outlets, about Hardy and
Packer ... "99
Georgia's Civil Practice Act merely requires "notice pleading." See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8;
Peacock Constr. Co. v. Erickson's, Inc .. 121 Ga. App. 544, 545(2), 174 S.E.2d 276 (1970)
(allegations of a complaint to the effect that the defendants intentionally and maliciously
published false, libelous and defamatory statements about the plaintiff which subjected the
plaintiff to ridicule and contempt and which damaged plaintiffs good name and reputation,

98
99

Defs' Answer and Counterclaim, iii] 65-70; Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim, ,rn 72-78.
Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim, ,i 73 (emphasis added).

Bronner v. Hardy, et al., CAFN 2014CV248023
Order on Pending Motions for Summary Judgment

51

stated a claim for which relief may be granted and sufficiently notified the defendants of the
basis therefor "so as to comply with the very minimal requirements of notice pleadings").
Here, Counterclaimants' October 2, 2014 pleading sufficiently places Bronner on notice
of the defamation claim asserted against him and of the allegedly ongoing nature of the tortious
conduct of which they accuse him. Any continued defamation, including the Jasper articles,
relate back to the initial counterclaim.
Further, although both Counterclaimants and Bronner separately assert they are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law based on the evidentiary record (or lack thereof), for the same
reasons set forth in Part II(A), supra, the Court finds questions of material fact regarding

Brenner's involvement with the Jasper articles and whether he slandered Packer preclude
summary judgment with respect to the defamation claim. Accordingly, Counterclaimants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff Bronner's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment with respect to this claim are both DENIED.
C. Unjust Enrichment
Rainforest asserts a claim for unjust enrichment against Bronner for using company
resources for his personal enjoyment rather than for the benefit of Rainforest (e.g., Los Angeles
apartment, cellular expenses, travel expenses, and automobile expenses) and alleging he
"coerced" Rainforest, Hardy and Packer to incur costs and enter into transactions that promoted
or benefitted "Bronner-related entities."100
As noted above, "[ujnjust enrichment applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal
contract..., but where the party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party
contending an unjust enrichment which the benefited party equitably ought to return or
100

Defs' Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim, iMJ 80-83.
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compensate for." Engram v. Engram, 265 Ga. 804, 806, 463 S.E.2d 12 (1995) (citing Smith v.
McClung. 215 Ga. App. 786, 789 (1994)). "The concept of unjust enrichment in law is premised
upon the principle that a party cannot induce, accept, or encourage another to furnish or render
something of value to such party and avoid payment for the value received."

Vernon v.

Assurance Forensic Accounting. LLC, 333 Ga. App. 377,394, 774 S.E.2d 197 (2015).
Nevertheless, "the mere fact that a person benefits another is not of itself sufficient to
require the other to make restitution therefor." Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 272 Ga. App. 817,
819(1), 615 S.E.2d 1 (2005). For unjust enrichment to apply" ... the party conferring the ... thing
of value must act with the expectation that the other will be responsible for the cost." Hollifield
v. Monte Vista Biblical Gardens, Inc., 251 Ga. App. 124, 131, 553 S.E.2d 662 (2001).
Here, Counterclaimants did not act with such expectation. The record establishes the
benefits provided to Bronner were derived in the normal course of Rainforest's operations and
were shared among the directors and that, although the parties regularly discussed the use of
company benefits, Counterclaimants never expressed any expectation that Bronner (or any
director) was to be personally responsible for the costs of the benefits conferred.

101

Plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the unjust enrichment claim is GRANTED
and Counterclaimants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the claim is DENIED.
D.

Expenses of Litigation

lnsofar as Counterclaimants' claims for breach of the non-disparagement provision and
defamation survive summary judgment, their claim for expenses of litigation also survives. See
Racette v. Bank of Am., N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171, 181, 733 S.E.2d 457, 466 (2012) ("An award
of attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages is derivative of a plaintiffs substantive claims")
IOI
Counterclaimants' SMF, Ex. I (AT&T Wireless Service Invoice), Ex. M (emails regarding corporate
apartment), Ex. N (emails regarding corpate vehicle); PJ's Appendix, Ex. U (2009 Rainforest P&L) at pp. 2-3.
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(citing Daiml erChry sler Motors Co. v. Clemente, 294 Ga. App. 38, 52(5), 668 S.E.2d 737
(2008)).
CONCLUSION
Having considered the entire record and for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:
GRA NTS Defendants' Motion for Summ ary Judgm ent with respect to Plaintiffs claims for
fraud, lack of candor, gross mismanagement, abuse of control, unjust enrichm ent, quantum
meruit, and for appointment of a receiver; GRANTS, IN PAR T, and DENIE S, IN PART,
Defendants' Motion for Summ ary Judgm ent with respect to Plaintiffs claims for breach of
contract, waste of corporate assets/misappropriation of corporate assets, and breach of fiduciary
duties as outlined above; GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Parti al Summary Judgm ent with
respect to Counterclaimants' claim for unjust enri chm ent and DENIES Counterclaimants'
Motion for Partial Summ ary Judgm ent with respect to that claim; and DENIES Plaintiffs
Motion for Parti al Summ ary Judgm ent and Counterclaimants' Motion for Partial Summ ary
Judgm ent with respect to Counterclaimants' claims for breach of the non-disparagement
provision in the Reconciliation Agreement, defam ation, and expenses of litigation.
In light of the Court's rulings, and insofar as there remain claims to be tried by a jury, a

proposed, fully consolidated pre-trial order that substantially complies with Uniform Superior
Court Rule 7.2 shall be submitted to the Business Court's chambers before 5:00 p.m. on
February 15, 2019. (Please do not present pre-trial orders to the clerk for filing unless they
have been signed by the Court). Plaintiffs counsel shall be responsible for consolidating the
pre-trial order. All other counsel shall provide their portions of the consolidated pre-trial order to
Plaintiffs counsel before 5:00 P.M. on February 8, 2019. Counsel shall not submit their own
individual portion of a pre-trial order to the Court without written certification detailing their
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good faith efforts to present the Court with a fully consolidated order. Extensions for submitting
proposed pre-trial orders will be granted only for good cause shown.
Upon receipt of counsels' proposed consolidated pre-trial order, the Court will establish
deadlines for the submission of motions in limine, requests to charge and for the trial of the
remainin g claims.

SO ORDERED, this 14th day of January, 2019.
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